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Central Issue
Whether 4th Amendment guarantees
have kept pace with new technologies
such as e-mail
Outline
A brief history of the 4th Amendment
The statutory scheme
– Wiretap Act & Electronic Communications
Privacy Act
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The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issues, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
1928 Olmstead Case Rejected Argument
that Wiretap Was Illegal – 4th Amendment
Applies Only to Physical Entry
The language of the amendment cannot be
extended and expanded to include telephone
wires, reaching to the whole world from the
defendant's house or office. The intervening
wires are not part of his house or office, any
more than are the highways along which they
are stretched.
Brandeis Dissent Foresaw Increased
Government Invasion of Privacy with
Development of New Technologies
The progress of science in furnishing the
government with means of espionage is not
likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some
day be developed by which the government,
without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will
be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.
1967 Katz Decision Overturned
Olmstead - Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
was Key, Not Physical Entry
Once it is recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects people - and not
simply "areas" - against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it becomes
clear that the reach of that Amendment
cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into
any given enclosure.
Wiretap Act of 1968 Required Court
Order Based On Probable Cause
Before intercepting a conversation by
wiretap or eavesdropping device, law
enforcement must obtain court order based
on showing that (i) there is probable cause
to believe that a crime has been or is being
committed, (ii) the conversations to be
intercepted must be particularly described,
(iii) the surveillance must be for a specific,
limited period of time.
Wiretap Act of 1968 Required Court
Order Based On Probable Cause
For purposes of a wiretap, probable cause is
a showing of facts sufficient to support
belief that
– a particular offense is being committed; and
– particular communications concerning that
offense will be obtained through interception.
Requirement applied only to
– “Wire communications” – communications by
telephone or telegraph
– “Oral communications” – speech uttered by a
person having an expectation of privacy
Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 Extended Wiretap Act Protection
to Other Forms of Communication
“Electronic communications” – any transfer
of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photo-electronic or photo-
optical system
“Interception” - intentional “acquisition of
the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device”
– Communication must be in “transit” – i.e.,
“acquisition of communications must be
contemporaneous with transmission” –
otherwise it is in “storage”
Stored Communications Presents
Special Problems In Applying 4th
Amendment Protections
Stored electronic communications (e.g.,
e-mail) generally reside on the servers
of a third party Internet service provider
(‘ISP”); thus, issue whether user has a
“reasonable expectation of privacy”
As a private party, ISP is not subject to
4th Amendment requirements – can
voluntarily turn over e-mail to
government
Stored Communications Act of 1986
Affords Some Privacy Protection
ISP serving the public cannot
voluntarily disclose contents of stored
communications to law enforcement
agency unless communications
– (i) were inadvertently obtained by the
service provider; and
– (ii) appear to pertain to the commission of
a crime
Government can compel disclosure by ISP
serving the public
– for e-mail that are in “temporary” storage (180
days or less) only by a search warrant (issued
under the probable cause standard)
– for e-mail in more permanent storage (greater than
180 days) either by search warrant, subpoena or by
court order supported by reasonable grounds (a
standard less than probable cause)
– Opened vs. unopened e-mail
Above rules apply to non-public providers only if the
email is unopened
Stored Communications Act of 1986
Affords Some Privacy Protection
Summary So Far
Under ECPA, electronic communications in
transit are afforded full 4th Amendment
protection (i.e., can be intercepted based only
on a search warrant showing probable cause)
Stored electronic communications is afforded
some, but not complete, 4th Amendment-type
protection under the SCA
Users of non-public network services
provided to an affiliated group (e.g., a
university’s or business’s e-mail system) are
afforded less protection under the SCA than
users of an ISP serving the public
Questions
If the critical 4th Amendment objective
(as per Katz) is to protect an
individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy, why should it matter if
electronic communications is in transit
or storage with an ISP?
Why should it matter if the ISP is
offering service to the public or not?
Warshak v. US – Is Constitution
Finally Catching Up with Technology?
Facts
– Subpoena’s issued to ISPs under SCA to
compel disclosure of content of
defendant’s stored (over 180 days) e-mails
Supported by standard of “reasonableness”
which requires less of a showing than
probable cause
– Defendant filed suit arguing that the
compelled disclosure of his e-mails by the
ISPs without a warrant supported by
probable cause violated the Fourth
Amendment
Warshak v. US – Is Constitution
Finally Catching Up with Technology?
U.S. Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit reasoned
– Even if e-mails are stored by a third-party ISP,
user could have a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” if ISP would not ordinarily view content
of e-mails
Court distinguished between situations where
– agreement between user and ISP allowed ISP to
continually monitor and audit content of e-mails – in
which case there would be no expectation of privacy, and
– agreement between user and ISP did not allow ISP access
to content of emails at all, or allowed access only under
extraordinary circumstances – in which case there would
be an expectation of privacy
Warshak v. US – Is Constitution
Finally Catching Up with Technology?
U.S. Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit ruled
– Under the facts of this case, defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy
– Government was not allowed to compel
disclosure of contend of defendant’s
emails without a warrant supported by
probable cause
Conclusions
Warshak case is the first court decision
making “expectation of privacy” – as it
should be - the determining factor in
deciding whether a warrant supported by
probable cause is required for e-mails
stored by ISPs
– Remarkably, this comes 40 years after Katz and
21 years after start of ECPA/SCA statutory regime
– Only applies in the 6th Cir., not clear if other
courts will follow, or whether Supreme Court will
review
Conclusions
Presumably, Warshak would apply to
private network service providers such
as university e-mail systems
– But private providers are more likely to
subject e-mails to regular monitoring as
part of terms of use
Should Congress amend SCA
consistent with Warshak?
